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rule before the court, the decision seems to be a logical extension 6f the law
of the District despite the denial of the right to the wife in foreign jurisdictions.
The wife's right to recover for loss of consortium negligently caused, has been,
and is, advocated by legal writers who stress the equal interest of the wife and
the husband in the consortium. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) at 566;
PROSSER, TORTS (1941) at 948; Lippman; The Breakdown of Consortium 30
COL. L. REV. 651 at 668 (1930); Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Con-
sortium, 22 MicH. L. REV. I at 8 (1923).
There is now, therefore, an authority in the United States that a wife has
a cause of action for loss of consortium due to the negligent injury of her hus-
band by the defendant. Whether this case and its reasoning will be followed in
other jurisdictions, or whether the sheer weight of contrary precedents will
prevail is a question for each jurisdiction to determine as the problem is raised.
Thomas J. Kelly
ANNULMENT PROCEEDINGS FOR FRAUD - SUFFICIENCY
OF PROOF - HOW TO PROVE REFUSAL TO HAVE
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE
In an annulment action based on the fradudulent implied promise to have
normal sexual relations, plaintiff gave evidence as to all the essential elements
of fraud and her son corroborated her as to certain admissions allegedly made
by defendant. Husband contended that plaintiff failed to show "other satis-
factory evidence" required by § 1143, N. Y. Civil Practice Act. Decree of
annulment affirmed. Held (4-3): Husband's ignorance of conspicuous scars
on wife's body sufficiently corroborated her claim of refusal to have normal
relations. DeBaillet-Latour v. DeBaillet-Latour, 301 N. Y. 428, 94 N. E. 2d
715 (1950).
This decision presents a timely re-examination of a vital evidentiary
factor in many annulment actions. Section 1143 of the Civil Practice Act pro-
vides that in an annulment action "the declarations or confessions of either
party to the marriage is not alone sufficient as proof, but other satisfactory
evidence of the facts must be produced." The statute is but a reiteration of a
rule whose origin is in the ecclesiastical court of England. See Davenbach v.
Davenbach, 5 Paige 554, 555, 28 Am Dec. 443 (N. Y. 1836); see also 2 BURN,
ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 509; 1 PHILLIMORE, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 640. In 1829
the New York Legislature embodied the rule in the Revised Statutes. Rev.
Stat., Part 2, ch. 8, tit. 1, § 36. In 1880 the provision was adopted into the Code
of Civil Procedure in § 1753. The present statute represents a repetition with-
out change of that section.
Absence of corroboration is the second most frequently raised defect re-
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lied upon in New York to guard against abuse of annulment procedure. See
48 COL. L. REV. 918, 919 (1948). Under this section, an annulment will not
be granted in New York without evidence of the facts other than the declara-
tions or confessions testified to by the plaintiff. Broad v. Broad, 40 N. Y. S.
2d 258 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Johnscn v. Johnson, 189 Misc. 131, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 493
(Sup. Ct. 1948). This provision applies both to contested and nQn-contested
annulment proceedings as well as to declaratory judgment actions to declare
marriages void. Feig v. Feig, 232 App. Div. 172, 249 N. Y. Supp. 95 (Ist Dept.
1931); Wilson v. Wilson, 181 Misc. 941, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 526 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
But see Caleca v. Caleca, - Misc. -, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 857, 858 (Sup. Ct. Jan.
1951), indicating that prior to the principal case § 1143 was not strictly ob-
served in uncontested actions. The statute stands as a bar to possible imposi-
tion on the court, collusion and easy dissolution of marriages. Fowler v. Fowler,
29 Misc. 670, 672, 61 N. Y. Supp. 109 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Labbate v. Labbate,
189 Misc. 447,451, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; see 9 CARMODY ON NEW
YORK PRACTICE, § 82.
Circumstances merely repelling suspicion of collusion or falsity do not
necessarily furnish affirmative corroborative evidence which will satisfy the
requirements of § 1143. Where fraud is involved the proof generally must be
clear, definite and convincing. Gabriel v. Gabriel, 274 App. Div. 141, 143, 79
N. Y. S. 2d 823, 825 (1st Dept. 1948); 35 AM. JUR., MARRIAGE, § 88; 55 C. J. S.,
MARRIAGE, § 58(c); 3 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT (2d Ed.) § 31.64.
A letter written to plaintiff's attorney is at best a confession by one of the
parties which is not enough to satisfy the section. Hallock v. Hallock, 62
N. Y. S. 2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1946). However, clar distinct confessions, not col-
lusive, corroborated by letters of the guilty party have been held sufficient.
Madge v. Madge, 42 Hun. 524 (N. Y. 1886). Furthermore the corroborative
evidence must not consist of a non-factual or cursory statement by an inter-
ested witness. Nilsen v. Nilsen, 66 N. Y: S. 2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1946). Corro-
borative testimony by a parent, brother, sister or other close relative to prove
the alleged imposition of fraud is regarded with suspicion by many courts. See
Gerwitz v. Gerwitz, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Hafner v. Hafner, 66
N. Y. S. 2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1946). There is some indication that conduct repug-
nant to federal statutory policy may act as a factor to be considered towards
mitigation of the proof demanded. See Rubman v. Rubman, 140 Misc. 658, 212
N. Y. Supp. 474 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (marriage to plaintiff in order to evade
United States Immigration Law quota).
The court has some discretion as to the amount and caliber of corrobora-
tive proof necessary, but has no discretion to override the statute and dispense
with corroboration altogether. Bentz v. Bentz, 188 Misc. 86, 67 N. Y. S. 2d
345 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Zoske v. Zoske, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1946). The
amount and character of proof required is in an inverse ratio to the circum-
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stances, probability and strength of the plaintiff's cause. See Zoske v. Zoske,
supra, at 834.
In the principal case, the majority's interpretation of the statute directs
the trier of facts to refuse an annulment unless he be able to recognize from
sources, other than the declarations of the parties, factual material which sub-
stantially verifies the integrity of the action. The rule is converted from one
of evidence to one for the guidance of the judicial conscience. See Winston v.
Winston, 165 N. Y. 553, 59 N. E. 273, aff'd, 189 U. S. 506 (1901). Under this
reading, appeals would be restricted to those cases in which appellant could
show that the trial forum was unreasonable in believing or disbelieving the
additional proof offered.
The opposite approach would require as a technical rule of law that each
vital factor of the action be established by "other satisfactory evidence." This
view indicates a formalistic approach" and exhibits greater concern for the tra-
ditional interest of the state in the preservation of marriages. By this concep-
tion, a defendant-appellant would prevail by showing that the "other evidence"
was insufficient to sustain the establishment of any one of the required ele-
ments of the action; an appealing plaintiff would be forced to show that the
additional proof established each factor. See. Matter of Case, 214 N. Y. 199,
108 N. E. 408 (1915); Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N. Y. 241, 54
N. E. 2d 809 (1944).
The instant case is indicative of a relaxed interpretation of the statute and
the majority has construed § 1143 to require only that there be in the record,
in addition to "declarations" or "confessions" of the parties, material from
other sources, substantial and reliable enough to satisfy the conscience of the
trier of the facts. The emphasis is apparently relaxed as to substantiation of
the factors constituting the fraud when demonstrated proof has impugned the
defendant's truthfulness. The result in this case is surely chargeable in part
to the pressure of modern liberal attitude, regarding the sanctity of the mar-
riage state, considered in light of New York's one-ground divorce law. But by
highlighting the existence and force of the statute, the decision may serve
rather, in a practical way, to raise the existing requirements for dissolution-
at least in uncontested annulment actions. See Caleca v. Caleca, supra, and the
comment of Referee Lapham in Richardson v. Richardson, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 219
(Sup. Ct. 1951) : "Certainly it (the principal case) is serving the very useful
purpose of stimulating the thinking of the Bench and Bar as to the exact
meaning of.§ 1143."
Morree M. Levine
NEGLIGENCE - LAST CLEAR CHANCE HELD APPLICABLE
THOUGH DEFENDANT'S DRIVER DID NOT SEE DECEDENT
Decedent and his brother hitched a ride on the side of defendant's truck
